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Abstract:
Since its inception in the early 1990s, the Tumen River Area Development Programme
(TRADP) has come to embody many of the hopes and frustrations of micro-regionalism in
Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. On the one hand, the project has been seen as a
means to utilise economic co-operation as a means to drive political and security co-operation.
But on the other, ambitious hopes for the project have been frustrated by the slow progress of
investment and economic integration amongst the localities and nation-states of the Northeast
Asia micro and sub-regions. This working paper argues that the key variable in explaining the
frustrations of micro-region building in the case of TRADP is a mismatch of the twin forces of
regionalisation and regionalism. For even though the TRADP may be predicated on the belief
that it can serve as a micro-regional focus for the territorial contiguities and economic
complementarities of the surrounding states in order to serve as a springboard for wide regional
integration, just as equally it has served the reverse function as a micro-regional focus and
intensifier of competing territorial claims and the political disputes of the major states, and
thereby, somewhat ironically, acted to actually undermine the process of regional integration.
The end result has been that TRADP as a potential micro-region has also fallen victim to
becoming a microcosm of the political rivalries in the region.
This working paper chronicles the evolution of TRADP, and analyses its supposed
economic rationale and the types of supra-state, local and non-state actors pushing for its
advancement, but also the political problems amongst the central governments of the region
which have undercut its progress to date. The conclusion of the working paper summarises the
lessons of TRADP for micro-regional processes elsewhere in the world, and considers the
possibility of TRADP's success in the future as the Northeast Asia political and security
scenarios begin to change in the new century.
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2Introduction: TRADP's ambitions and frustrations
TRADP as a panacea for Northeast Asian regional problems?
Following the end of the Cold War, region-building has held out to many--academic
commentators and practitioners alike--the prospect of creating new avenues for
economic co-operation and security, and for restructuring the international order to cope
with the onset of the pressures of globalisation. As is well documented, the
revitalisation in the late 1980s and 1900s of the European Union's (EU) project of
regional integration across the three dimensions of economics, politics and security, also
helped at the same time to spur on regional projects in the Asia-Pacific and Northeast
and Southeast Asia. Regional projects such as Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) certainly differ significantly from
European examples in being predicated primarily upon co-operation in the economic
dimension, and emphasising the development of 'soft' rather than 'hard' institutional
arrangements (Katzenstein 1997: 12). Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that such
regional projects have been left totally unaffected by the types of considerations
embodied in the European region concerning the function of economic co-operation in
generating political and security co-operation. Even the most hardened and shrewd of
academics or policy-makers in the Asia-Pacific and East Asia, and especially in the
perceived heyday of regional dynamism and APEC summitry in the early to mid-1990s
and prior to the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, would have found it difficult
to suppress entirely hopes that macro and sub-regional economic co-operation could
bring positive political and security benefits to each of the states involved and the
region as a whole (Funabashi 1995: 9-10; Foot and Walter 1999: 259-62).
3Similarly, region-building on the micro-scale in East Asia has also not proved immune
to this infectious optimism about the prospects of economic co-operation leading to
political and security stability. Since the early 1990s, the micro-regional project which
best illustrates these aspirations and which has been the most prominent of its type in
Northeast Asia has been that of the Tumen River Area Development Programme
(TRADP), involving the six national states of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia,
Mongolia and Japan. The Tumen River delta is located at the point of convergence of
the national and provincial borders of the DPRK, the Russian Far East (comprising
Sakha Republic; Magadan Province; Chukotka Province; Kamchatka Province; Koryak
Autonomous District; Amur Province; Khabarovsk Territory; EVA Jewish Autonomous
Province; Primorye Territory, and Sakahalin Province), and northeast PRC (comprising
the provinces of Heilongjiang; Jilin; and Liaoning) (see map). The subsequent rationale
of TRADP has been that this unique contiguity of territories should provide also unique
opportunities for cross-border economic interaction, and, on a wider scale, open up an
economic axis linking Mongolia and the interior of Northeast Asia with the Sea of
Japan. Indeed, the attraction of the project is that economic co-operation concentrated at
the micro-geographical and micro-regional level around the Tumen River delta would
provide a focus and conduit through which to draw ROK and Japanese Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) into the larger Northeast Asia sub-region. ROK and Japanese FDI
would seek to exploit the economic complementarities of the region and knit together a
market with up to 300 million consumers and a total GNP of US$3 trillion (Kakazu
1995; Marton et al 1995; Taga 1994: 31; Tumen Secretariat 1996). In the case of
TRADP, therefore, it is believed that geographical contiguities coupled with potential
4economic complementarities on the micro-regional scale can also drive forward on a
larger sub-regional scale integration amongst the economies of the surrounding nation-
states. In turn, the deliberately expressed hope of policy-makers involved with TRADP
is that enhanced economic co-operation will generate, 'improved political relations and
stability' across the region (Tumen River Area Development Programme 2000a).
However, as will be elucidated later in this paper, it is also clear that ambitions for
TRADP to serve in the post-Cold War period as a micro-regional hub for enhanced
economic, political and security co-operation across the entire Northeast Asia region
have been largely frustrated. TRADP has been repeatedly revised and down-sized since
its inception in the early 1990s, and, as TRADP officials responsible for its promotion
themselves acknowledge, investment in the programme has ranged from 'disappointing'
to 'unspectacular but solid' (Tumen River Area Development Programme 2000b).
Moreover, many commentators of a more 'liberal-minded' perspective, both within and
outside the Northeast Asia region, have expressed growing disillusionment with the
failure of TRADP to bring as yet any significant political and security benefits.
TRADP's mismatched micro-regionalisation and mirco-regionalisation
TRADP can then be seen to incorporate both the high aspirations but also lowly
frustrations of micro-regionalism. Given the dual-character of TRADP, this working
paper will endeavour to analyse the reasons for the slow progress of the project, and to
utilise it as a case study in order to enhance our understanding of the factors which
account generally for the varying dynamism of micro-regional processes across the
world. More specifically, the evolution and success of TRADP will be analysed in
5accordance with the degree of interaction of the twin concepts of regionalisaton and
regionalism (Payne and Gamble 1996: 2). Regionalisation, as the first of the processes
accounting for region-building, is understood here as the growth of interdependence
amongst a limited number of state or sub-state elements linked together by relative
geographical proximity due to the operation of 'autonomous' forces. By 'autonomous' it
is meant that various economic actors and forces, and to some degree political and
security actors and forces as well, work in an unconscious or unplanned fashion for the
enhancement of regional integration. Hence, in the case of economic regionalisation on
the macro, sub or micro-scales, these actors and forces generally take the form of
private sector corporations and related trade and investment flows which function across
regions, and at times heedless of national territorial boundaries, in order to exploit
economic complementarities. The operation of these types of regionalisation actors and
forces, without a conscious 'grand plan' in the mould of the EU, but nevertheless leading
to regional integration, equates to what Robert Scalapino has described as the
resurgence of latent 'natural economic territories' (Scalapino 1991-92: 19-30; Jordan and
Khanna 1995: 433-62).
Regionalism is the second process that can be said to work in the service of region-
building, the particular focus being upon the '-ism' as representing a conscious attempt
by nation state central or local government actors, as well as often non-state actors, to
foster the principles and projects of regional integration. These projects may consist of
active efforts to create the conventions, regimes and institutio s which can serve to bind
regions together, as with the case of the more heavily institutionalised projects in
Europe. Alternatively, regionalist conceptions may be more passive in nature and take
6the form of simply the approval of nation state actors for regional projects, with only a
minimal government input in terms of creating the frameworks which allow for the freer
operation of regionalisation actors and forces. This type of regionalism involves at the
very least an implicit government commitment not to impede the process of
regionalisation, and is more akin to the type of 'soft' regionalism in the Asia-Pacific
identified above.
This working paper distinguishes regionalisation and regionalism as two sets of
processes and related actors and forces which account for the growth of regions, but in
practice they are mutually reinforcing and need to be present for the sustained success
for region-building. As in the case of the EU, and to some degree APEC, evidence of
economic integration and regionalisation can been seen to drive greater demands for
conscious regionalism and the establishment of institutions to facilitate regional
interacton, and this then creates a firmer basis for the unimpeded flow of regionalisation
forces.
As will be demonstrated in the sections below, it is on this point that the chief
explanation for the frustrations of TRADP's micro-regionalism can be discerned.
TRADP represents a case study in which the rich economic complementarities of the
surrounding states argue strongly for enhanced economic co-operation and private
sector-led regionalisation over the longer term. However, TRADP also stands as a case
study which demonstrates the ways in which the potentially successful operation of
regionalisation processes can become hamstrung by the defects of regionalism. In
TRADP's instance, these defects should not necessarily be attributed to a lack of
7regionalist sentiment or ambition on the part of the involved actors. On the contrary, as
mentioned above, the majority of the actors share a common commitment to achieving
the 'holy grail' of some form of functioning region in Northeast Asia. T  defects of
regionalism in TRADP lie instead in the over-proliferation of varying regionalist
conceptions of the type and extent of region-building that the project should be designed
to achieve, and the mismatched economic and political interests of the multifarious
central and local nation state, and also to some extent supra-state, actors involved. Most
particularly, even though TRADP in many ways was initiated as a means to alleviate the
political and security problems of Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War period, it is in
fact these very issues which have impeded its own progress. For even though TRADP
may be predicated on the belief that it can serve as a micro-regional focus for the
territorial contiguities and economic complementarities of the surrounding states in
order to serve as a springboard for wide regional integration, it should be remembered
that just as equally it can serve the reverse function as a micro-regional focus and
intensifier of competing territorial claims and the political disputes of the major states,
and thereby, somewhat ironically, act to in fact undermine the process of regional
integration. The end result has been that TRADP as a potential micro-region has also
fallen victim to becoming a microcosm of the political rivalries in the region.
Plan of the paper
The following sections of this working paper are designed to elucidate in more detail
this key argument that the mismatch of regionalism and regionalisation processes has
been responsible for the slow progress of TRADP. The first section provides a brief
historical overview of micro-regional integration in Northeast Asia in order to
8demonstrate how the forces of regionalism and regionalisation have moved both in
conformity and conflict in the past, and subsequently accounted for the successes and
failures of various regional projects. This section is also essential in providing an
introduction to the key political problems of the past w ich continue to set the context
for and hinder regionalism in the contemporary period. The next section then surveys
the contemporary situation of the Northeast Asia sub and mirco-region, pointing out its
diversity but also latent economic complementarities. This is followed by a section
which explains more fully the evolution of the TRADP concept and its hopes for
exploiting the complementarities of the micro-region, but also the defective nature of
regionalism in Northeast Asia which has undermined the project's success. Finally, the
conclusion makes some further observations about the need for regionalism and
regionalisation to work in tandem, the lessons for our understanding of micro-regional
processes elsewhere, and the prospects for TRADP in the future.
Historical perspectives on the Northeast Asia sub and micro-regions
Arguably, the first identifiable historical sub-region in Northeast Asia with micro-
regional elements was that of the Sino-centred regional order in existence from the
Ching Dynasty through to the late nineteenth century. Although the use of anachronistic
terminology should be avoided, there are grounds for viewing Chinese suzerainty and
its associated tributary system as bringing into existence prototype forms of Northeast
Asian sub and micro-regions. The dominance of the Chinese order and its loosely
defined concepts of sovereignty acted as regionalist, or centripetal, forces to reduce
barriers to interaction and draw the countries of the region together. Regionalisation
forces also functioned under Chinese suzerainty as it allowed for the development of a
9system of trading zones to exploit economic complementarities, such as those centred
on the Kingdom of the Ryûkyûs, Kyûshû, Taiwan, and Eastern China to the south of the
region, and the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk to the north (Hamashita
1997: 116)
However, the 'natural economic territories' of this era were to be disrupted by the
enforcement of the Western imperial order on East Asia in the late nineteenth century
through to the start of World War II. Imperialism in Northeast Asia initially adapted
itself to the Chinese regional order through its exploitation of the treaty port system, but
inevitably regionalism became subordinated to imperialism as the imposition of
European empires on Southeast Asia and sections of Northeast Asia began to prise apart
cross-regional linkages. The introduction along with imperialism of the concepts of the
Westphalian state system and strict territorial sovereignty acted to partition the region
and inhibit economic interaction. In turn, the overturning of regionalism by imperialism
was to generate centrifugal forces which undermined 'natural economic territories', and
dictated that the economies of the region should instead look outwards to the economic
networks of the imperial powers.
The lead up to and outbreak of the Pacific War saw the displacement of the Western
imperial order by new sub and micro-regional orders centred on Japan. Japan's attempt
to remodel the region around the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and enhance
regional economic, political, and security interdependence represented the exact
equation of regionalism with imperialism. This regionalist imperialism did encourage
some economic regionalisation, as Japan worked to incorporate its colonies into one
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major production chain centred on itself. For example, on the micro-regional scale,
much of Japan's industrialisation efforts between the wars was concentrated upon
Northeast China, the Korean Peninsula, and the Sea of Japan. In 1910, the Russian Far
East accounted for around 10 per cent of Japan's exports, and Northeast China and the
Korean Peninsula between 17 and 18 per cent (Kannihonkai Kenkyûjo 1999: 1).
Nevertheless, Japan's introduction of this imperialism-based regionalism and
regionalisation into Northeast Asia ultimately failed, imposed as they were by military
coercion, and leaving a legacy of economic malformation for those countries forced into
the Japanese production chain--the most notable examples being the unbalanced
development of the northern and southern halves of the Korean Peninsula (Hughes
1999: 117-18).
Hence, following Japan's military defeat in 1945 its Asian regionalist project sprung
apart, to be replaced by a new Cold War regional order. The centrifugal forces of the
Cold War spelled the suppression of regionalism by bi-polarism, and compounded the
imperial legacy of the economic, political, and security separation of the states of the
region. The USSR's Far Eastern provinces, the PRC, DPRK, the ROK, and Japan were
all placed in separate economic blocs to varying degrees under the stewardship of the
USSR and US, where free economic interaction between the constituent members of
each of these bi-polar camps was impeded. Japan was severed from its former colonies
and markets in the Korean Peninsula and China, and was unable to resume significant
trading and investment relations with the ROK until the normalisation of relations in
1965, and with the PRC until normalisation in 1972. Meanwhile, the continued hostility
between Japan and the USSR throughout the Cold War seriously curtailed trade
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relations with the Russian Far East (Howell 1993). The Korean Peninsula was truncated
across the 38th parallel, leaving the ROK as a virtual island separated from the Northeast
Asian continent and unable to trade with the USSR and PRC until the normalisation of
relations in 1990 and 1992 respectively. Similarly, the DPRK was cut off entirely from
economic contact with the ROK and encountered great difficulties in trading with
Japan, with which it has never maintained normalised diplomatic relations. Mongolia
was integrated largely into the Soviet Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Aid, or
CMEA) system. Finally, the PRC was not only unable to trade with Japan and the ROK
for a considerable time span during the Cold War, but following the Sino-Soviet split
also curtailed its trading relations with the Russian Far East. The Sea of Japan, even
though the natural route for interaction between these neighbouring economies, became
a 'cold sea', or 'sea of confrontation' with reduced economic and political
interdependency, and the states surrounding it again turned away to their respective
economic blocs on the outside or periphery of the region--the PRC and the DPRK to the
Soviet Union, the ROK and Japan to the US. Only military and security
interdependency continued, as the USSR and US and their respective military allies
confronted each other across the Sea of Japan.
The contemporary situation of the Northeast Asia sub and micro-regions
Divergent political economies
The above description of the development and retrogression of the Northeast Asia sub
and micro-regions up until the end of the Cold War suggests that not since the Chinese
World Order has there been a regional grouping which combines effectively the two
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forces of regionalisation and regionalism. Furthermore, not only does this historical
description explain the failures of past regional projects, it also indicates how in the
post-Cold War contemporary period Northeast Asia remains a divided region with deep-
rooted obstacles to further integration.
In terms of political relations, Northeast Asia micro-region continues in the post-Cold
War period to be characterised by a fractured mosaic of states, which includes the
divided nations of the DPRK and ROK, Russia, Japan and the Northern Territories, and
further afield the PRC and Republic of China (ROC) Compounding national and
territorial divisions is the divergence of the political economy of each state in Northeast
Asia. Political and economic systems range from the still relatively isolated dictatorship
in the DPRK expressing a mix of revolutionary socialism, anti-colonialism,
Confucianism, and self-reliance, or juche, ideology; to the PRC still under one-party
communist rule, but embarked upon economic liberalisation and reengagement with the
global economy; to Mongolia controlled by reformist socialist and communist parties;
to Russia, which has undergone a rapid transformation to democracy and a market
economy; to the ROK, which has long had a market economy, but more recently has
made a transition to stable democracy; and finally to Japan, which has proved to have
the most durable democracy and dynamic economy in Northeast Asia. This picture of
the diversity of the domestic political systems of each national state is compounded by
the fragmented nature of political and security links amongst them: Japan still to sign a
peace treaty with Russia and to normalise relations with the DPRK; the DPRK and
ROK approaching rapprochement but still in armed confrontation; and the PRC
remaining suspicious of Japanese designs for hegemony in the region.
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Accompanying these variations in the political economies of the region are marked
variations in stages of economic development. Japan remains the economic giant of
Northeast Asia, weighing in with an impressive Gross National Product (GNP) of
US$4,591 billion, and an average income per capita of US$36,728 which is many times
greater than that of its neighbours (Table 1). The ROK ranks second to Japan in terms of
economic prowess due to its rapid industrialisation and technological development, but
still records less than a tenth of Japan's GNP, and was hard hit by the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997, although it is at present growing again strongly. The DPRK
represents the 'sick man' of Northeast Asia with a GNP of only US$21 billion and which
is believed by ROK sources to be contracting at the rate of anything up to 5 per cent
annually. By contrast, the PRC over the last decade has witnessed rapid economic
growth at around 10 per cent per annum, although this has been characterised by
increasing disparities between the booming coastal areas and economic stagnation in
many interior areas (Breslin 2000: 213). The Russian Far East economy is also highly
variegated, with some advanced technological and military industries, but also a  h avy
dependence upon resource extractive industries and a shortage of labour. Mongolia
brings up the rear in the Northeast Asia development stages with a GNP of just US$1
billion and a population of 3 million.
Table 1
This picture of economic diversity between the states in the Northeast Asia sub-region
is further reinforced by the types of internal economic disparities that occur within each
individual state. The Sea of Japan coast of Japan, or 'backdoor Japan' (u a Nippon), is
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relatively underdeveloped compared to the Pacific side of the country (Furumaya 1998:
132-75; Kaneda 1997: 110-15), and in the Northeast PRC, Heilongjiang, Jilin and
Liaoning provinces which once enjoyed high levels of industrial development compared
to the rest of the country now find themselves falling behind provinces such as
Guangdong and other Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Moreover, following the end of
the Cold War, the Russian Far East has partially lost its privileged position as the
strategic outpost of Moscow in Northeast Asia, which means that, with the onset of
market liberalisation and an end to price and transport subsidies, the competitiveness of
its products has been undermined.
Low levels of economic interdependence
The divergent nature of the political economies of Northeast Asia has inevitably
produced low levels of economic interdependence. As Table 2 illustrates, in 1996 only
the national economies of the DPRK and Mongolia have a high level of
interdependency with the Northeast Asia sub-region, with the other states of the region
typically accounting for between 65 and 85 per cent of these two states' exports and
imports.  For the ROK these levels were only around 25 to 28 percent, for the PRC
around 20 to 34 per cent, for Japan around 14 to 17 per cent, and for Russia ranging
from 5 and 14 per cent. Hence, the impression is of a sub-region which still looks
predominantly outwards and away from itself in terms of trade orientation and
interdependency, especially with regard to the larger and more dynamic economies in
the region.
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Although the data is more fragmented in Table 2 and Charts 1 and 2, the picture for the
micro-region centred on Japan, the ROK, the DPRK, Northeast PRC, and the Russian
Far East is not much more impressive. The DPRK, Northeast PRC, and Russian Far
East all direct between 40 and close to 50 per cent of their exports to within the micro-
region, and draw between 22 and 34 per cent of their imports from the same area.
Furthermore, for states such as Japan, trade with other states in the region is so low as to
be almost negligible in terms of its total world trade--the DPRK, for instance,
accounting, for only that 0.1 per cent of Japan's total exports and 0.08 of its total
imports. Japan itself is the major source of the exports and imports of a number of states
in the subregion, but still over 90 per cent of its total trade is conduct d with other
regions of the world. Therefore, even though Japan is the major economic power
located geographically within Northeast Asia, its external links with other areas mean
that its prime economic interests are located outside the region and that it does not form
an integral part of it. Japan's only trading relationship in Northeast Asia which
approximates to one of interdependence is that with South Korea, but even this
relationship is highly asymmetrical as South Korea accounts for only around 7 per cent
of Japan's exports and 5 per cent of its imports, whilst Japan occupies 14 per cent of
South Korea's exports and 21 per cent of its imports.
Table 2 and Charts 1 and 2
In addition to low levels of trade interdependence, Japan's investment in Northeast Asia
is also comparatively low. Table 3 demonstrates that Northeast Asia accounts for 4.5
per cent of Japan's total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and that the majority of this is
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concentrated in the PRC and ROK. Thus, in contrast to Southeast Asia, where Japanese
FDI has worked to bind the region together economically, Japanese FDI does not yet
appear to be performing this function in the Northeast Asia sub-region. Finally, in
comparison with the more dynamic regions of each of the national economies of the
region, and due to the legacy of relative neglect during the Cold War period, the rail,




The overall picture of the Northeast Asia sub and micro-regions after the Cold war is,
then, one of significant divergence within and amongst the political economies of each
state, and on an initial look not the most promising basis for co-operation. The outcome
of this has been to limit economic and political interdependence and to restrain the
forces of both regionalisation and regionalism, giving rise to only limited efforts at
region-building. However, as already noted above, despite these severe limitations upon
the growth of a Northeast Asia subregion in the past, the hopes in the 1990s onwards
has been that the release of the centrifugal pressures of the Cold War could foster the
conditions for the reintegration of the Northeast Asia sub and micro-regions. In
particular, sections of the Northeast Asian central and local government policy-making
and business community, spurred on by the progress of larger region-building projects
such as the EU and APEC and hopes for greater local autonomy brought about by
decentralisation, have begun to conceptualise new economic sub-regions in the Yellow
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Sea and Sea of Japan (Postel-Vinay, 1996). This re-emergence of regionalist projects
and the discourse of regionalism has also been matched by the potential stirring of
regionalisation forces. As noted in the introduction and Table 4, the expectation is that
the complementary resources of the region, now unimpeded by Cold War barriers, could
be mobilised and create something akin to Scalapino's 'natural economic territories'.
Thus, it could be expected that the low factor endowments of the developed economies
of the region could be compensated for by the correspondingly high factor endowment
of other less developed states, and vice versa. The combination of these varied but rich
complementarities could be the natural outgrowth of economic synergy and integration
in the Northeast Asia micro-region. For example, it is clear that despite certain political
barriers, cross-border trade between the PRC and Russian Far East has begun to flourish
in the post-Cold War period and reached US$2 billion in 1993, as private actors have
sought to match together and exploit the relative factor endowment of each others' states
(Kerr 1996: 943). Even in the Sea of Japan, where Japan and Russia continue to be
divided politically by the issue of the sovereignty of the Northern Isles, the early 1990s
witnessed a small scale but nevertheless lively trade in good such as crab and fish and
second-hand cars between the two states as private business actors begin to exploit the
re-opened access to economic complementarities after the end of the Cold War
(Rozman 1999: 16, 21.).
Table 4
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TRADP's evolution and frustrations
The above discussion has indicated that in the post-Cold War world, and in particular
during the early 1990s, the twin processes of regionalism and regionalisation have
begun reappear, so leading to sub and micro-regional integration becoming envisaged as
practical possibilities. The introduction has already described how TRADP emerged
very much as the result of this perceived renaissance in regionalism in Northeast Asia in
the 1990s. Table 5 summarises the chronology of the project, and shows that the it was
initiated following the 1st Northeast Asian Development Conference held in the PRC at
which it was suggested that the Tumen Rivers geographical and economic
complementarities would form the basis for a 'Tumen River Golden Triangle'
development zone. The concept was subsequently taken up by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), which an ambitious plan for TRADP produced in
October 1991, consisting of US$30 billion over a twenty-year period; the creation of a
UN 'international city'  to link together Free Economic Zones (FEZ) located at Rajin in
the DPRK, Hunchun in the PRC and Posyet in Russia to form a 1,000 kilometres
Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ); and, to support the TREZ, a larger 10,000
kilometre Northeast Asia Regional Development Area (NEARDA) triangle centred on
Chongjin in the DPRK, Yanji in China, and Vladivostock and Nakhodka in Russia. A
Programme Management Committee (PMC) was established to study the feasibility and
guide the preparation of the project was also established at this time. In the meantime,
the USSR government, soon to become the Russian Federation, established the
Nakhodka FEZ in July 1990, North Korea the Rajin Free Economic and Trade Zone
(FETZ) in December 1991 (later extended to become the Rajin-Sonbong FETZ in
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September 1993); and the China the Hunchun Border Economic Co-operation Zone in
October 1992.
A series of six PMC meetings was held between February 1992 and December 1995. At
the 3rd PMC in May 1993 the riparian states agreed to lease land to be administered by a
jointly owned Tumen River Development Corporation, but the 4th PMC in July 1994
this plan along with the UNDP master plan had been abandoned due to legal difficulties
involved with leasing sovereign territory and the problems in raising the necessary
finance. The 5th PMC focussed instead on harmonising the separate FEZs, with the
establishment of a Co-ordinating Committee to promote co-operation on investment,
trade and infrastructure amongst the participating countries, and the signing of
memorandum on environmental principles. In April 1996 a Tumen River Secretariat
was established in Beijing to manage the project. The UNDP has continued to attempt
to co-ordinate economic activities in each of the FEZ's, and some notable improvements
have been made in the infrastructure of the TRADP micro-region, such as an investment
of US$1.3 billion by China for road improvements around Hunchun and to the DPRK
border crossing at Quanhe/Wonjong, and the opening of a Hunchun/Krakino railway
crossing at the PRC-Russia border. A number of new ferry routes have also been
opened over the last few years, including one from Posyet in Russia to Akita in Japan.
Table 5
Thus, it can be seen that TRADP has been under discussion for already more than a
decade and since 1995 has moved from the preparation to the enactment stage.
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Nevertheless, despite the UNDP's and involved states' ambitions hopes for TRADP, the
project's progress has been undermined primarily by defective or 'flawed' regionalism
(Rozman, 1998). The states involved in the TRADP, whilst undoubtedly aware of the
potential economic attractions of the project, continue to lack the necessary degree of
regionalist sentiment and conscious political commitment to, or at the very least
political toleration of, the regionalist project to allow it to fully succeed. In particular, it
is apparent in many cases that the aims and aspirations of central and local government
regionalist projects in each of the states in the Northeast Asia sub and micro-regions are
incompatible. One of the earliest and most notable examples of this being the decision
taken to scrap the UNDP's US$30 billion master plan for an 'international city' and
mutually reinforcing micro and sub-regional development triangles centred on the
Tumen River. In large part, the plan was simply too grandiose and could never have
attracted sufficient finance. But the failure of the plan was also due to the legal and
political problems involved in each of the states relinquishing sovereignty, however
temporarily, over their own territory, much of which was only recently acquired and
still in dispute, as in the case of the Russian-PRC border at Tumen.
The concern of central governments to preserve their territorial integrity in dealing with
other central governments and the problems it generated for the UNDP regionalist plan,
have also been reproduced in the dealings between central and local governments. The
government of the Russian Federation has impeded the progress of TRADP and the
economic freedom of local provinces, concerned as it is about the effects of an 'open'
regionalist project in the Russian Far East and an influx of FDI (and especially Japanese
FDI) which could pull this area away from Moscow's economic control, capture its rich
21
economic resources for another foreign power, and encourage political separatism (Kerr
1996: 946). The central government's suspicion of TRADP was exemplified in the
Duma's decision in 1993 to rescind Nakhodsk free economic zone's tax privileges, and
its continued delay in ratifying an agreement to ratify a Russian-ROK agreement in May
1999 to create a Russo-Korean Industrial Complex in the Nakhodka FEZ (Tumen River
Area Programme 2000c).
Likewise, although the Hunchun Border Economic Co-operation Zone is undoubtedly
the most successful of the FEZs located close to the Tumen River (the population
quadrupling from 50,000 to 200,000 between 1992 and 1998 and foreign investment
reaching US$100 million [Tumen River Area Development Programme (2000b]), the
central government of the PRC has made it clear that its national priorities still lie in the
economic development of South China, Shanghai and the Three Gorges project, and has
shown suspicion of any attempts by Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces to
increase their economic autonomy. M reover, the PRC government is more committed
to the existing infrastructure in place in Dalian as the optimum route to the Sea of Japan,
and only appears to support TRDAP on the grounds that it will provide Jilin province
with access to the Sea of Japan and break China's dependence on Russian ports, rather
than being a project which will promote interdependence between the two states (Cotton
1996).
The DPRK has been the most enthusiastic advocate of the TRADP, desperate as it is to
secure the foreign investment it may attract. But in the same way as the PRC and
Russia, the limits to its regionalist perspective have undermined the project. The DPRK
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also opposes regionalism based on relatively unrestricted private sector exchange due to
its implications for the Pyongyang regime's totalitarian political and economic control,
and has attempted to confine free economic interchange to its Rajin-Sonbong Free
Economic and Trade Zone (FETZ). The DPRK's cagey approach towards economic
engagement and interdependence with neighbouring states, compounded by periodic
security crises has also acted to deter investment in the FETZ and slow the progress of
this third element of the TRADP. The DPRK has also been reluctant until recently to
accept large-scale FDI from its rival the ROK: for instance, limiting the number of ROK
companies able to attend its investment forum in September 1996 and thus forcing a
general boycott of ROK investment at this time. The ROK government and private
corporations for their part have shown some interest in the Rajin-Sonbong FETZ, but
their greatest political and business interests really lie in investing outside the zone,
such as Hyundai's plan for an industrial complex at Haeju close to the Demilitarised
Zone (DMZ) and the North-South border and Daewoo's small textile factory at Nampo.
The outcome has been that, even though North Korea claimed that its September 1996
investment forum at Rajin-Sonbong attracted pledges of US$307 million, cumulative
enacted FDI in the zone was estimated by outside sources only US$58 million in 1997
(JETRO 1999: 231).
However, the greatest drag on the development plans of the TRADP is the lack of
Japanese central government interest in the project, which then feeds through into a lack
of Japanese private business interest. Japan's poor relations with Russia, and the absence
of a peace treaty leaving the two states still technically at war, has meant that its central
government has resisted serious economic co-operation with the Russian Far East until
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there is a resolution to the Northern Isles issue. Even more importantly, Japan and the
DPRK's lack of normalised relations, and the disastrous experience of failed Japanese
investments in the 1970s and DPRK defaults on up US$900 million of loans from
Japanese corporations (Hughes 1999: 134-7), acts to discourage private businesses from
investing in the DPRK which is aware that it cannot count upon government support for
their activities in this potentially risky region. Finally, it is clear that the Japanese
government, despite conducting through the Japan International Co-operation Agency
(JICA) a study on the transport corridor between Changchun and Tumen ports in June
1998, is more interested in providing Official Development Assistance for infrastructure
development and loans to assist private business to exploit the economic opportunities
of coastal southern China. The government has shown some interest in supporting
potential Japanese production bases in northeast PRC and the exploitation of the rich
natural resources of the Russian Far East, but the small markets of the DPRK come
firmly at the bottom of the list of public sector investment priorities as long as the state
of non-normalised relations persists. Japanese private business itself has also largely
plumped within the Northeast Asia sub-region and Tumen micro-region for investment
in the northeast PRC, attracted by advanced economic reforms, cheap labour (US$60
per month in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in the PRC, compared with
US$80 per month in the Rajin-Sonbong FEZ [Tumen River Area Development
Programme 2000d]) and access to the larger Chinese market.
In contrast to the Japanese central government, many of the local authorities on the Sea
of Japan coastline are certainly eager for increased interaction with neighbouring states,
seeking ways to stimulate the prefectural economies of Ura Nipp n. For example,
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Niigata Prefecture and City were active in sponsoring local government links across the
Sea of Japan in order to create a 'Sea of Japan' rim identity; Kanazawa City in Ishikawa
prefecture has looked to form linkages with the Russian Far East; as has Hokkaidô
Prefecture and Sapporo City. This enthusiasm amongst local actors for the revitalisation
of Sea of Japan interchanges was reinforced in part by non-state actors such as the
community of DPRK citizens resident in Japan eager to expand contacts between small
and medium sized enterprises in both states. Moreover, the efforts of local authorities
and non-state actors have found some support amongst the more 'liberal' or 'idealistic'
political constituencies of Japan, hoping to utilise enhanced regional co-operation as a
means to generate 'people-to-people diplomacy', transform the Sea of Japan into a 'sea
of peace and friendship' (eiwa to yûjô no umi), and create an supplement or alternative
to Japan's perceived dependency upon the US for the provision of security in this
region. But the central government's lack of active backing for the Sea of Japan
regionalist project, coupled with the continued reliance of the localities in Japan upon
the spoils of economic redistribution from the centre, thus militating against the need to
truly breakaway from dependency upon the centre and look outward to the neighbouring
states for new economic opportunities, puts a brake on local government efforts to
enhance interdependent relations with Northeast Asia (Rozman 1999). Once again,
therefore, it is possible to speak of Japan as an economic superpower located
geographically within Northeast Asia, but which due to its low level of economic and
political interdependence with the surrounding states is not a fully functioning
component of the regionalist project.
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The overall outcome of the minimal or restricted commitment to the TRADP by the
central governments of the involved states has been to frustrate hopes that the project
could evolve into a 'natural economic territory' and drive forward economic growth. In
fact, rather than leading to the harmonisation and synergy of economic resources, the
impression is that since the mid-1990s the FEZs of the respective states have been in
competition with each other for the small amounts of FDI and trade available in the
micro and sub-regions. The UNDP also seems largely ineffective in trying to remedy
these problems, restricted as it is by the prerogatives of the sovereign states involved in
TRADP, and unable to move the project forward by encouraging more external
investment. Hence, the UNDP's plan for the establishment of Northeast Asia/Tumen
Investment Corporation to mobilise funds and compensate for the DPRK and Russia's
non-membership of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), one potential but non-
participating member of TRADP, has not yet been approved (Kannihonkai Kenkyûjo
1999: 160).
The key variable which would seem to explain the disappointing progress of TRADP is
not the lack of the potential regionalisation forces and economic complementarities
which are necessary to undergird the dynamism of the project, but rather a deficiency of
shared regionalist sentiment on the part of the central governments which would allow
then to step back from intervention in micro-regional interaction and allow
regionalisation forces to flow smoothly. Instead, it is apparent that regionalism in the
case of the TRADP is usually subverted to national economic and political rivalries--
central governments viewing the regionalist project as a means to gain economic
advantage over the other involved states.
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Conclusion: TRADP's lessons for region-building and future prospects
From the above it is clear that TRADP is an example of micro-regionalism frustrated
and sabotaged by a mismatch of regionalisation and regionalism forces. As noted in the
introduction, region-building is very much a process which relies on the two wheels of
regionalism and regionalisation moving forward in co-ordination with each other. In the
case of TRADP it would appear that the wheel of regionalism is severely distorted and
out of synch with that of regionalisation, if refusing at times to move forward
altogether.
The principal analytical, or even policy, lesson to be learned from TRADP is that
micro-region building is likely to founder in Northeast Asia and in other contexts across
the world unless regionalisation and regionalism forces are combined and compatible
with each other. TRADP's planners, particularly at the central government level, and
perhaps also in the UNDP have failed to take on board or to act upon this policy lesson.
TRADP started out embodying multifarious hopes for economic integration as a catalyst
for political and security co-operation. However, the assumption on the part of many
seems to have been that the apparently irresistible logic of the economic
complementarities of the micro-region would be sufficient on its own to ameliorate and
skirt around the government level political and security obstacles to the progress of
TRADP. But whether due to a genuine lack of foresight or element of wishful thinking,
the establishment of TRADP and rush to jump on the bandwagon of region-building,
whilst at the same time underestimating many of the political difficulties involved and
the oft willingness of central government policy-makers to resist seeming economic
logic in the name of national political interest, has meant that the project has lacked
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dynamism and not produced many of the hoped for political and security benefits seen
in other regional projects. At present, and despite ten years of work, TRADP remains an
under-achieving micro-regional project and will continue to be so as long as it is forced
to serve as a crucible to test regional political rivalries.
Nonetheless, this is not to say that the project is necessarily fundamentally flawed and
the Northeast Asia sub and micro-region doomed to underdevelopment over the long
term. There are still many opportunities to correct the deficiencies of regionalism
observed above. Japan and Russia have shown signs of diplomatic rapprochement since
1997 and the then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryûtarô announced a new 'Euroasia'
policy emphasising the development of the Russian Far East and beyond. Even though
the Japanese objective of a Russo-Japanese peace treaty by 2000 has not been achieved,
the improvement of relations between the two states has created a more stable
environment and the type of passive regionalism which can facilitate private sector
business interaction across the sub-region.
In a similar fashion, hopes of rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula between the
DPRK, ROK, US, and Japan brought about by the 1994 Agreed Framework, the four-
way peace talks since late 1997, Kim Dae Jung's 'sunshine policy', and the restart of
Japan-DPRK normalisation talks in early 2000 may all act to lower the political
obstacles to enhanced economic interdependency in the region. The historic first talks
between the DPRK and ROK leaders in June 2000 have also brought hopes of expanded
inter-Korean economic co-operation. As noted above, if increased ROK investment in
the DPRK is realised, much of this is likely to concentrated on the border rather than in
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the TRADP micro-region. But the overall effect of ROK-DPRK co-operation should be
to foster improved investment and trading conditions in the Sea of Japan. Moreover, the
normalisation of Japan-DPRK, if ever achieved, should finally bring sufficient amounts
of Japanese FDI into play in the micro-region and power the project forward.
Furthermore, just as the US plays a balancing role in security in Northeast Asia, so
might it be able to play a balancing role in economic affairs, if it were to fully lift
sanctions on the DPRK as a indication of its willingness to promote the DPRK's entry in
the regional community. Finally, regionalism may be given a boost with the greater
participation of multilateral institutions in the project. If the ADB were to become a full
partner in the TRADP along with the UNDP, this could serve to eliminate some of the
bilateral suspicions hindering the project and widen the regionalist perspective of the
central governments involved. Th refore, if deeper regionalism can be set alongside the
already strong and latent forces of regionalisation in Northeast Asia, an effective micro-
region driving further sub and macro-regional integration amongst this diverse set of
states could yet be built, the legacy of the fractured region of the past overcome, and
significant steps taken towards building realising the hoped for framework of peace and
security in the post-Cold War era.
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Japan 125 378 331 4,591 36,728
ROK 44 99 444 381 8,660 4.2








































Source: Kannihonkai Keizai Kenkyûjo, Hokutô Ajia: Nijû Isseki no Furontia, Tôkyô,
Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1996.
[ ] represents total for Northeast Asia countries
( ) represents total for Northeast Asia subregion (Japan, ROK, DPRK, Northeast China,
Russian Far East, Mongolia)



















































































































































































































































n.a n.a 11,615 13.6 85,294

























n.a. 93 22.4 301 72.5 415
Total micro-regional
imports
21,424 33,042 526.06 n.a 2,015 n.a 467 86
Share of micro-
regional imports (%)
6.1 22.0 27.2 n.a 33.9 n.a 23.0 19.6
Total sub-regional
imports





17.4 27.9 68.3 33.8 n.a 4.6 n.a 85.4
Total world imports 349,508 150,370 1,931 138,949 5,949 62,678 2,031 439
Figures in [ ] are percentages of exporting country/region's total world exports
Figures in ( ) are percentages of improting country/region's total world imports
Source: KanNihonkai Keizai Kenkyûjo, p. 6.










































































































Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 2,617
Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0
Total sub-
regional FDI






1.3 15.1 33.7 5.8 0.1 8.7
Total world FDI 5,527 3,086 10 45,257 6,241 252
Figures in [ ] are percentages of investing country/region's total world FDI
Figures in ( ) are percentages of receiving country/region's total world FDI
Source: Jettro Bôeki Hakusho 1999nenhan.
Table 4: Potential comparative and complementary factor endowments in
Northeast Asia micro-region





Arable crop land Low Low Low High Low Low
Pastoral crop land Low Low Low Medium Low High
Mineral resources Low Low High Medium High High
Energy resources Low Low Medium High High Medium
Labour surplus Low Low Medium High Low Low
Capital surplus High Medium Low Low Low Low
Advanced technology High High Low Low Low Low
Management expertise High High Low Low Low Low
Developed heavy industry High High Medium Medium Medium Low
Vanguard industry High High Low Low Low Low
Transport infrastructure High Medium Medium Medium Low Low
Sources: Adapted from Hwang, 1993: 299.
Table 5: Chronology of TRADP and national FEZ (Free Economic Zones)
Date TRADP FEZ
TRADP Stage 1: Preparation
1990 Jul 1st Northeast Asian Economic Development Conference (Changchun, PRC)
-PRC proposes development of 'Tumen River Golden Triangle'
1990 Nov Russian Nakhodka Free
Economic Zone (FEZ)
established
1991 Jul United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Northeast Asia Region
Planning Meeting
(Ulan Bator, Mongolia)
-UNDP and delegates from PRC, ROK, DPRK, and Mongolia officially adopt
Tumen River development concept
1991 Oct UNDP Northeast Asia Region Co-ordination Meeting
(Pyongyang, DPRK)
-UNDP proposes master plan for Tumen River Area Development Programme
(TRADP):
l US$30 billion investment over 20 years
l Creation of UN 'international city' to link Rajin (DPRK)-Hunchun (PRC)-
Posyet (Russia) Tumen River Economic Zone (TREZ) 1,000km sq. small
development triangle
l Rajin-Hunchun-Posyet TREZ supported by Chongjin-Yanji-
Vladivostock/Nakhodtka North East Asia Regional Development Area
(NEARDA) 10,000 km sq. large development triangle
-Russian and Japanese delegates participate
-Tumen River Area Development Programme Management Committee (PMC)
established to study and implement the project
Dec Russia becomes full member of TRADP, Japan remains an observer DPRK Rajin Free
Economic and Trade
Zone (FETZ) established
1992 Feb 1st PMC (Seoul, ROK)
-feasibility studies of TRADP
-Russia invited to join PMC as full member
-Asian Development Bank (ADB) invited to join PMC as observer
1992 Oct 2nd PMC (Beijing, PRC)








1993 Russian Nakhodka FEZ
tax privileges abolished
May 3rd PMC (Pyongyang, DPRK)
-PRC, DPRK, Russia agree to lease land for TREZ to be administered by jointly-
owned Tumen River Development Corporation
Sep DPRK Rajin-Sonbong
FETZ established
1994 Jul 4th PMC (Moscow, Russia)
-TREZ land lease plan and UNDP US$30 master plan abandoned due to legal,
sovereignty, management and financial problems
-agree less ambitious project focussed on harmonising separate FEZ projects
1995 May 5th PMC (Beijing, PRC)
3 agreements reached:
l PRC, DPRK and Russia to establish Coordinating Committee for TREZ to
replace PMC, revitalise project, and advise and coordinate investment
l PRC, DPRK, Russia, ROK, Mongolia to establish Consultative Commission
for TREZ to promote communications, trade, finance, energy
l PRC, DPRK, Russia, ROK, Mongolia agree on Memorandum of
Understanding on Environmental Principles
TRADP Stage 2: Enactment
1995 Dec 6th PMC (New York, USA)
-3 agreements officially signed
1996 Apr 1st Coordinating Committee (Beijing, PRC)




Oct 2nd Coordinating Committee (Beijing, PRC)
-decision to invite formal membership of Japan
1997 Nov 3rd Coordinating Committee (Beijing, PRC)
-discuss promotion of investment and tourism
-UNDP and ROK agree to provide US$4.4 million to technology support fund







1999 Jun 4th Coordinating Committee (Ulan Bator, Mongolia)
-UNDP proposes establishment of Tumen Investment Corporation
